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1 Introduction
Mixed strategies are usually regarded as unappealing because they are not only hard
to interpret, but also, considered as too complex for real players to use. Motivated by
this view, game-theorists have provided several purification theorems that describe
when mixed strategies can be replaced by (approximately) equivalent pure strategies.
Several purification results have been obtained for games with a large number of
players. Such results include those of Rashid (1983) and Wooders, Cartwright, and
Selten (2006) for complete information games with finite action spaces and Cartwright
and Wooders (2002) for incomplete information games with finite type and countable
action spaces.1 All these results show that if the number of players in a game is suf-
ficiently large, we can associate each Bayesian Nash equilibrium with a pure strategy
approximate equilibrium such that the two strategies yield approximately the same
payoff to each type of each player.
However, there are many economic examples that do not satisfy the above as-
sumptions. An example is provided by the following Cournot oligopoly game. In
such a game, n firms produce a nonnegative quantity of a certain good, which due
to capacity constraints, cannot exceed a given level m. If firms produce quantities
x1, . . . , xn, then the market price of the good is P (
∑n
i=1 xi/n), implying that the
revenue of firm i is P (
∑n
i=1 xi/n)xi. The cost for each firm of producing a quantity
x is C(t, x), where t is the firm’s type and can be understood as its productivity
level. The payoff (i.e., profit) of firm i when its type is t and its quantity is xi is
then P (
∑n
i=1 xi/n)xi − C(t, xi). Since the action space of each firm is the interval
[0,m], and so uncountable, none of the above purification results can be applied to
this game. Our main result shows that if both functions P and C are continuous and
each firm’s type is commonly known (i.e., the game is of complete information), then
all Nash equilibria of this game can be approximately purified when the number of
1In Wooders, Cartwright, and Selten (2006), each player’s payoff depends on the (empirical)
distribution over types and actions, where players’ types, although being deterministic, can belong
to a compact type space. In contrast, in Rashid (1983), each player’s payoff depends, besides on his
type and action, only on the (average) distribution over actions.
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firms is sufficiently large. Furthermore, if each firm’s type is its own private infor-
mation (i.e., the game is of incomplete information), then the same conclusion holds
whenever type spaces are compact and firms’ types are determined independently.
More generally, we consider incomplete information games with finite number of
players in which each player’s payoff depends only on his type-action character and
either on the average or the empirical distribution of type-action characters of the
others. Our purification result shows that if players’ types are independent and their
payoff functions are selected from an equicontinuous family, then all Bayesian Nash
equilibria of sufficiently large games can be approximately purified.
Our contribution is to provide a purification result that allows for incomplete in-
formation games with general compact type and action spaces, a case that has not
been dealt with in the literature. Furthermore, we show how our result generalizes
those of Rashid (1983) and Wooders, Cartwright, and Selten (2006) both by allow-
ing for incomplete information (with independent types drawn from a compact type
space) and a compact action space. However, our result is neither implied nor does
it imply the purification theorem of Cartwright and Wooders (2002) as explained in
Subsection 5.4 below. Furthermore, we do not consider the concept of self-purification
as defined in Kalai (2004). Since self-purification is a stronger requirement than the
purification notion we consider (as shown by Cartwright and Wooders (2004)), it fol-
lows that our result, although it applies to the setting of Kalai (2004), does not imply
his self-purification result. However, since Kalai’s result assumes that both the type
and action spaces are finite, our result is also not implied by his.
We wish to emphasize that, although our result differs from the self-purification
theorem of Kalai (2004), our framework relates to his. Indeed, in both frameworks,
players’ types are drawn independently and each player’s payoff function is selected
from an equicontinuous family and depends on his type, action and on the empirical
distribution over types and actions. The difference is that, while Kalai (2004) assumes
that both the type and action spaces are finite, we allow them to be an arbitrarily
compact metric space. A similar comparison can be made regarding the framework
of Rashid (1983). Indeed, our framework reduces to that of Rashid (1983) when
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we specialize the type space to be a singleton, the action space to be finite and by
considering payoff functions that depend on the average distribution over types and
actions.
The relationship between our framework and that of Wooders, Cartwright, and
Selten (2006) is less direct and will be discussed in detail in Subsection 5.3. In a
sense to be made precise, their framework correspond to our framework when players’
types are deterministic, the action space is finite and all players have the same payoff
function, which depends on the empirical distribution over types and actions. Finally,
as we noted above, there is no formal relationship between our framework and that
of Cartwright and Wooders (2002). In fact, we allow for uncountable type and action
spaces whereas they allow for noncompact action spaces (a more detailed discussion
is provided in Subsection 5.4).
Our approach requires only elementary arguments. We start by establishing a
purification result for finitely supported approximate equilibria in games with finitely
supported distributions over types. The proof of this result is based on the Shapley-
Folkman theorem (see Starr (1969)) in a way similar to that given by Rashid (1983).
This basic result is then extended to the general case of games with compact metric
spaces of types and actions.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present our notation and def-
initions. Our purification result is presented in Section 3 and its proof in Subsection
3.1. In Section 4 we show that our result applies to the Cournot oligopoly exam-
ples described above. Finally, on Section 5, we relate our framework and result to
those of Rashid (1983), Cartwright and Wooders (2002), Kalai (2004) and Wooders,
Cartwright, and Selten (2006).
2 Notation and Definitions
We start by presenting two classes of Bayesian games. In both of them, each player’s
payoff function depends on his type, his action and on a distribution over types and
actions induced by the choice of the other players. They differ because we consider
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the average distribution in one class and the empirical distribution in the other.
We start by describing the elements that are common to the two classes. In both
classes, all players have a common type space T and a pure strategy space X.
Assumption 1 Both T and X are compact metric spaces.
We let dT and dX denote the metric on T and X, respectively. Since the focus
is on a property that depends on the number of players, we will index any game by
the number of its players. Thus, Gn is a Bayesian game in which the set of players is
In = {1, . . . , n}, and each has T as his type space and X as his choice set.
Players are allowed to choose randomized strategies. In this context, a randomized
strategy for a player is a function from types into a Borel probability measure on the
set of his pure strategies. Let M(X) be the set of Borel probability measures on
X endowed with the weak convergence topology. This topology is induced by the
Prohorov metric on M(X). Thus, a randomized strategy for player i ∈ In is a Borel
measurable function σi : T →M(X). A strategy is pure if its values are degenerate
probability measures on X. Thus, if for all x ∈ X, 1x denotes the probability measure
on X that attributes probability 1 to x, then a strategy fi : T → M(X) is pure if
for all t ∈ T , there exists x ∈ X such that fi(t) = 1x. Let Σ denote the set of all
(randomized) strategies.
For all i ∈ In, player i’s type is decided by nature according to τi ∈ M(T ). This
probability measure, together with a strategy σi : T → M(X), defines a measure
τi ⊗ σi on T ×X as the unique measure satisfying
τi ⊗ σi(A×B) =
∫
A
σi(B|t)dτi(t) (1)
for all Borel measurable subsets A of T and B of X (see Ash (1972, Theorem 2.6.2,
p. 97)). We let ρ denote the Prohorov metric in M(T ×X).
In both classes, players’ payoff functions are defined using a function on types,
actions and distributions. To each player i, we associate a function V ni : T × X ×
M(T×X)→ R with the following interpretation: V ni (t, x, µ) is player i’s payoff when
he is of type t, plays action x and faces the distribution µ.
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Assumption 2 For all i ∈ In, V ni is continuous.
In both classes of games that we consider, a game is defined using the same
elements: In, Vn, τn, T and X. Thus, we represent a game by Gn = (In, Vn, τn, T,X).
We let U denote the space of all continuous real-valued functions on T×X×M(T×
X) endowed with the sup norm. For each game Gn, let Vn(In) = {V ni : i ∈ In} ⊆ U .
A subset K of U is equicontinuous if for all η > 0 there exists a δ > 0 such that
|v(t, x, µ) − v(w, y, ν)| < η whenever max{dT (t, w), dX(x, y), ρ(µ, τ)} < δ, t, w ∈ T ,
x, y ∈ X, µ, τ ∈ M(T ×X) and v ∈ K. A subset K of U is bounded if there exists
ξ > 0 such that |v(t, x, µ)| ≤ ξ for all t ∈ T , x ∈ X, µ ∈M(T ×X) and v ∈ K.
The two frameworks we consider differ on how players’ payoff functions are defined
from V ni , as will be described in the following subsections.
2.1 Average Distribution
In this case, each player’s payoff depends on his type-action character and on the
average distribution of type-action characters of the others. Given a strategy σ =
(σ1, . . . , σn) ∈ Σn in a game Gn with n players, the average distribution is:
σ¯ =
∑
i∈In
τi ⊗ σi
n
. (2)
Similarly, for all i ∈ In, the average distribution of the other players is
σ¯−i =
∑
l 6=i
τl ⊗ σl
n− 1 . (3)
Note that both σ¯ and σ¯−i are elements of M(T × X). Then, for all strategies σ,
player i’s payoff function is
Uni (σ) =
∫
T
∫
X
V ni (t, x, σ¯−i)dσi(x|t)dτi(t). (4)
We denote this class of games by GR, which is formally defined in the following
definition.
Definition 1 A Bayesian game Gn = (In, Vn, τn, T,X) belongs to the class GR if Uni
is defined by (4) for all i ∈ In and both Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied.
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2.2 Empirical Distribution
In this case, players’ payoff functions are defined (from V ni ) in the following way. Let
C = T ×X, i ∈ In and c−i ∈ C−i = Cn−1. Define a measure empc−i ∈M(T ×X) by
empc−i(B) =
|{j 6= i : cj ∈ B}|
n− 1 (5)
for all Borel measurable subsets B of T × X. The measure empc−i is the empirical
distribution and the quantity empc−i(B) is simply the fraction of players other than
player i with type-action characters in the set B.
The following lemma shows that if two vectors c−i and cˆ−i are close, then so will
be empc−i and empcˆ−i .
Lemma 1 Let i ∈ In and η > 0. If maxj 6=i d(cj, cˆj) ≤ η, then ρ(empc−i , empcˆ−i) ≤ η.
Proof. Let D be a Borel measurable subset of T ×X. Since cj ∈ D implies that
cˆj ∈ Bη(D), then
empc−i(D) =
|{j 6= i : cj ∈ D}|
n− 1 ≤
|{j 6= i : cˆj ∈ Bη(D)}|
n− 1 = empcˆ−i(Bη(D)). (6)
Thus, ρ(empc−i , empcˆ−i) ≤ η.
In particular, Lemma 1 implies that the function emp : c−i 7→ empc−i is con-
tinuous, which, in turn, implies that the function c 7→ V ni (ci, empc−i) is continuous.
For all strategies σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) ∈ Σn and i ∈ In, let τ ⊗ σ =
∏
l∈In τl ⊗ σl and
[τ ⊗ σ]−i =
∏
l 6=i τl ⊗ σl, and define
Uni (σ) =
∫
Cn
V ni (ci, empc−i)dτ⊗σ(c) =
∫
C
∫
Cn−1
V ni (ci, empc−i)d[τ⊗σ]−i(c−i)dτi⊗σi(ci).
(7)
We denote this class of games by GK .
Definition 2 A Bayesian game Gn = (In, Vn, τn, T,X) belongs to the class GK if Uni
is defined by (7) for all i ∈ In and Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied.
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2.3 Equilibria and Purification
Let G = GR ∪ GK . The following notions and notation apply to all Gn in G.
For convenience, let, for all i ∈ In, t ∈ T , x ∈ X and σ ∈ Σn, Uni (x, σ−i|t) =∫
C−i
V ni (t, x, empc−i)d[τ ⊗ σ]−i(c−i) if Gn ∈ GK and Uni (x, σ−i|t) = V ni (t, x, σ¯−i) if
Gn ∈ GR be player i’s payoff when his type is t, he plays x and the other players play
according to σ−i. Furthermore, let Uni (σ|t) =
∫
X
Uni (x, σ−i|t)dσi(x|t) for all i ∈ In,
t ∈ T and σ ∈ Σn be player i’s payoff when his type is t and σ is played. Using this
notation, we can write Uni (σ) =
∫
T
Uni (σ|t)dτi(t).
For all ε ≥ 0, we say that a strategy σ is a strong ε – equilibrium of a game Gn
if Uni (x, σ−i|t) ≥ Uni (xˆ, σ−i|t) − ε for all i ∈ In, t ∈ T , x ∈ supp(σi(t)), and xˆ ∈ X.
Thus, in a strong ε – equilibrium all players assign a strictly positive probability only
to the actions that are within ε of their best response. A strategy σ is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of Gn if σ is a strong ε – equilibrium of Gn for ε = 0.
We remark that this definition is equivalent to the more common one, according
to which a strategy σ is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium if for all i ∈ In and t ∈ T , σi(t)
maximizes player i’s payoff given that the others are using σ−i.
Let σ be a strong ζ – equilibrium of a game Gn. Then, we say that g is an ε –
purification of σ if g is a pure strong ζ + ε – equilibrium and
|Uni (g|t)− Uni (σ|t)| < ζ + ε, (8)
for all i ∈ In and t ∈ T . Thus, under g, all players are playing actions that are ζ+ε –
best responses to g−i. Furthermore, their payoff under g is close to their payoff under
σ for all possible types. In particular, when σ is a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of Gn
and g is an ε – purification of σ, then g is a strong ε – equilibrium and each player’s
payoff under g is, for each type, within ε of that under σ.
3 Purification of Equilibria
Our main result says that in all sufficiently large games, all Bayesian Nash equilibria
can be ε – purified, provided that players’ payoff functions are selected from a bounded
8
equicontinuous family (and that we can dispense with the boundedness of the family
of payoff functions for games in the class GR).
Theorem 1 Let K be an equicontinuous subset of U . Then, for all ε > 0, there
exists N ∈ N with the following property:
If n ≥ N and Gn = (In, Vn, τn, T,X) ∈ GR is such that Vn(In) is a subset of K,
then all Bayesian Nash equilibria of Gn can be ε – purified.
If, in addition, K is bounded, then the same conclusion holds for the class GK.
3.1 Proof of Theorem 1
The proof of our purification result follows two steps in both of the frameworks.
First, we establish a purification result for finitely supported approximate equilibria
in games with finitely supported distributions over types. Second, we show that such
games and equilibria can be used to approximate general equilibria in general games.
Lemma 2 Let K be an equicontinuous subset of U and m, p ∈ N. Then, for all ε > 0
there exists N ∈ N such that:
If n ≥ N and Gn = (In, Vn, τn, T,X) ∈ GR is such that Vn(In) ⊆ K and there
exists a finite subset Tˆ of T with |Tˆ | = p and supp(τni ) ⊆ Tˆ for all i ∈ In, then all
strong ζ – equilibrium ν of Gn, ζ ≥ 0, can be ε – purified provided that there exists a
finite subset Xˆ of X with |Xˆ| = m and supp(νi(t)) ⊆ Xˆ for all i ∈ In and t ∈ T .
Furthermore, we can chose the ε – purification g so that gi(t) = gi(t
′) for all
i ∈ In, t ∈ T \ Tˆ and t′ ∈ Tˆ , such that νi(t) = νi(t′).
If, in addition, K is bounded, then the same conclusion holds for the class GK.
Although Lemma 2 implies the purification theorem of Rashid (1983), which cor-
responds to the case of ζ = 0, X finite and T singleton, its proof follows closely
Rashid’s arguments.2 As there, the critical result for the construction of the purifi-
cation strategies is the Shapley-Folkman Theorem.
2Although the equicontinuity assumption was not made explicit in Rashid (1983), it is needed as
we have shown in Carmona (2004).
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Proof. Let ε > 0. Let 0 < η < ε/2B with B = 1 if Gn ∈ GR and B = 4ξ + 3
if Gn ∈ GK , where ξ > 0 is such that |v(t, x, µ)| ≤ ξ for all t ∈ T , x ∈ X and
µ ∈M(T ×X) (such ξ exists whenever K is bounded).
Since K is equicontinuous, let δ > 0 be such that |v(t, x, τ) − v(w, y, µ)| < η
whenever max{dT (t, w), dX(x, y), ρ(τ, µ)} < δ, x, y ∈ X, τ, µ ∈ M(T × X) and
v ∈ K.
Finally, let N ∈ N be such that n > m, 4m2p/(n−1) < δ and 2mpe−2n(δ/2mp)2 < η
whenever n ≥ N . In particular, m2p/n < δ/2 and 2/(n− 1) < δ/2 for all n ≥ N .
Let n ≥ N and Gn be a game in G and ν be a strong ζ – equilibrium satisfying
the assumptions in the statement of the lemma.
Let t ∈ Tˆ and define for all i ∈ In
Si,t =
{
τi(t)
n
ej : νi(xj|t) > 0
}
, (9)
where E = {e1, . . . , em} is the standard basis of Rm. In particular, note that Si,t = {0}
if τi(t) = 0. However, if τi(t) > 0, then (n/τi(t))Si,t ⊆ E.
Note also that (τi(t)νi(x1|t)/n, . . . , τi(t)νi(xm|t)/n) ∈ co(Si,t) for all i ∈ In and
t ∈ Tˆ . This implies that
(ν¯(t, x1), . . . , ν¯(t, xm)) =
n∑
i=1
τi(t)
n
(νi(x1|t), . . . , νi(xm|t))
is an element of co (
∑n
i=1 Si,t) =
∑n
i=1 co(Si,t). By the Shapley-Folkman Theorem (see
Rashid (1983)), it follows that there are n points αi(t) = (αi(x1|t), . . . , αi(xm|t)) ∈
co(Si,t), with i ∈ In, such that |{i ∈ In : αi(t) 6∈ Si,t}| ≤ m and
(ν¯(t, x1), . . . , ν¯(t, xm)) =
n∑
i=1
(αi(x1|t), . . . , αi(xm|t)).
Since Si,t = co(Si,t) = {0} if τi(t) = 0, then {i ∈ In : αi(t) 6∈ Si,t} ⊆ {i ∈ In : τi(t) >
0}. Hence, |{i ∈ In : τi(t) > 0 and nαi(t)/τi(t) 6∈ E}| ≤ m.
For all t ∈ Tˆ , let Pt = {i ∈ In : τi(t) > 0 and nαi(t)/τi(t) ∈ E}. Define a pure
strategy g as follows: if i ∈ Pt, let ej be such that nαi(t)/τi(t) = ej and define gi(t) =
1xj ; if i ∈ P ct , choose 1 ≤ j ≤ m such that νi(xj|t) > 0 and define gi(t) = 1xj . Finally,
for all t ∈ T \ Tˆ , let x ∈ supp(νi(t)) and set gi(t) = 1x. Since the only requirement
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that we impose on gi(t) when t ∈ T \ Tˆ is that gi(t) ∈ supp(νi(t)), it is clear that we
can let gi(t) = gi(t
′) whenever t′ ∈ Tˆ and νi(t) = νi(t′). It follows from the definition
of gi that gi(t) ∈ supp(νi(t)) for all t ∈ T and so Uni (gi(t), ν−i|t) ≥ Uni (x, ν−i|t) − ζ
for all i ∈ In, t ∈ T and x ∈ X.
Note that, for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and t ∈ Tˆ , g¯(t, xj) =
∑
i∈Pt αi(xj|t)+ 1n
∑
i∈P ct τi(t)gi(xj|t).
Hence,
|ν¯(t, xj)− g¯(t, xj)| = 1
n
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈P ct :τi(t)>0
τi(t)
(
nαi(xj|t)
τi(t)
− gi(xj|t)
)∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ mn . (10)
The following claim states that conditional payoffs under ν are close to those under
g.
Claim 1 For all i ∈ In, x ∈ X and t ∈ T , |Uni (x, ν−i|t)− Uni (x, g−i|t)| < ε/2.
Proof of Claim 1. We consider two cases: when Gn ∈ GR and when Gn ∈ GK .
In both cases, the following result is used.
Claim 2 If Ψ is a finite subset of a metric space Y and both µ and pi are probability
measures supported in Ψ such that |pi({l})−µ({l})| ≤ q for all l ∈ Ψ and some q > 0,
then ρ(pi, µ) ≤ |Ψ|q.
Proof. Let q > 0 and B ⊆ Y be Borel measurable. Then,
µ(B) =
∑
l∈Ψ∩B
µ({l}) ≤
∑
l∈Ψ∩B
(pi({l}) + q) ≤
∑
l∈Ψ∩B
pi({l})+ |Ψ|q ≤ pi(B|Ψ|q(B))+ |Ψ|q.
Symmetrically, we have that pi(B) ≤ µ(B|Ψ|q(B)) + |Ψ|q. This implies that ρ(µ, pi) ≤
|Ψ|q.
Case 1 Gn ∈ GR.
It follows from Claim 2 and (10) that ρ(ν¯, g¯) ≤ m2p/n < δ/2. As can be easily
verified, we also have that ρ(σ¯, σ¯−i) ≤ 1n−1 for all i ∈ In and strategies σ. Thus, it
follows that ρ(ν¯−i, g¯−i) ≤ ρ(ν¯−i, ν¯)+ρ(ν¯, g¯)+ρ(g¯, g¯−i) ≤ 1/(n−1)+δ/2+1/(n−1) < δ
for all i ∈ In. Therefore, |Uni (x, ν|t) − Uni (x, g|t)| = |V ni (t, x, ν¯−i) − V ni (t, x, g¯−i)| <
η < ε/2.
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Case 2 Gn ∈ GK.
Note that, for all strategies σ, i ∈ In and t ∈ T ,
Uni (x, σ−i|t) =
∫
T−i×X−i
V ni (t, x, emp(t−i,x−i))d[τ ⊗ ν]−i(t−i, x−i)
=
∫
Tˆ−i×Xˆ−i
V ni (t, x, emp(t−i,x−i))d[τ ⊗ ν]−i(t−i, x−i).
(11)
Thus, it is enough to consider (t−i, x−i) ∈ Tˆ−i × Xˆ−i.
Let i ∈ In and define
nbd(ν¯−i, δ′) = {(t−i, x−i) ∈ Tˆ−i × Xˆ−i : max
(t,x)∈Tˆ×Xˆ
|emp(t−i,x−i)(t, x)− ν¯−i(t, x)| ≤ δ′}.
(12)
Note that if (t−i, x−i) is such that emp(t−i,x−i) belongs to nbd(ν¯−i, δ/2mp), then
ρ(emp(t−i,x−i), ν¯−i) ≤ |Tˆ×Xˆ|δ/2mp = δ/2 < δ (by Claim 2). Thus, |V ni (t, x, emp(t−i,x−i))−
V ni (t, x, ν¯−i)| is smaller than η if emp(t−i,x−i) ∈ nbd(ν¯−i, δ/2mp) and smaller than 2ξ
if emp(t−i,x−i) 6∈ nbd(ν¯−i, δ/2mp).
Let γ = [τ ⊗ ν]−i({(t−i, x−i) ∈ Tˆ−i × Xˆ−i : emp(t−i,x−i) 6∈ nbd(ν¯−i, δ/2mp)}). By
Kalai (2004, Lemma 4), then γ < 2mpe−2n(δ/2mp)
2
and so∣∣∣∣∫
Tˆ−i×Xˆ−i
V ni (t, x, emp(t−i,x−i))d[τ ⊗ ν]−i(t−i, x−i)− V ni (t, x, ν¯−i)
∣∣∣∣
< γ2ξ + (1− γ)η < 4mpξe−2n(δ/mp)2 + η < (2ξ + 1)η.
(13)
Similarly, we have that∣∣∣∣∫
Tˆ−i×Xˆ−i
V ni (t, x, emp(t−i,x−i))d[τ ⊗ g]−i(t−i, x−i)− V ni (t, x, g¯−i)
∣∣∣∣ < (2ξ + 1)η. (14)
As shown in Case 1 above, we have that ρ(ν¯−i, g¯−i) < δ and |V ni (t, x, ν¯−i)− V ni (t, x, g¯−i)| <
η. Hence, |Uni (x, ν−i|t)− Uni (x, g−i|t)| < (4ξ + 3)η < ε/2.
It follows from Claim 1 that, for all i ∈ In, t ∈ T and x ∈ X,
Uni (gi(t), g−i|t) > Uni (gi(t), ν−i|t)−
ε
2
≥ Uni (x, ν−i|t)−
ε
2
− ζ > Uni (x, g−i|t)− ε− ζ. (15)
Therefore, g is a pure ζ + ε – equilibrium of Gn.
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Since ν is a strong ζ – equilibrium, it follows that |Uni (x, ν−i|t)−Uni (xˆ, ν−i|t)| ≤ ζ
for all i ∈ In, t ∈ T and x, xˆ ∈ supp(νi(t)). Hence,∣∣∣∣∣
m∑
j=1
νi(xj|t)Uni (xj, ν−i|t)− Uni (gi(t), g−i|t)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤∣∣∣∣∣
m∑
j=1
νi(xj|t)Uni (xj, ν−i|t)− Uni (gi(t), ν−i|t)
∣∣∣∣∣+ |Uni (gi(t), ν−i|t)− Uni (gi(t), g−i|t)| < ζ + ε.
(16)
Thus, |Uni (ν|t)−Uni (g|t)| < ζ+ε for all i ∈ In and t ∈ T and so g is an ε – purification
of ν.
We turn to the proof of Theorem 1. It consists of approximating any Bayesian
Nash equilibrium in any game with a compact type and action space with a finitely
supported approximate equilibrium in a game with finitely supported distributions
over types, and then applying Lemma 2 to the latter.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let ε > 0 and let 0 < γ < ε/20. Since K is equicontin-
uous, there exists δ > 0 such that max{dT (t, w), dX(x, y), ρ(µ, ν)} < δ implies that
|v(t, x, µ) − v(w, y, ν)| < γ for all t, w ∈ T , x, y ∈ X, µ, ν ∈ M(T ×X) and v ∈ K.
Since X is a compact metric space, let Xˆ = {x1, . . . , xm} be a finite subset of X and
{Xj}mj=1 be a finite measurable partition of X such that xj ∈ Xj ⊆ Bδ/4(xj) for all
j = 1, . . . ,m. Similarly, let Tˆ = {t1, . . . , tp} be a finite subset of T and {Tl}pl=1 be a
finite measurable partition of T such that tl ∈ Tl ⊆ Bδ/4(tl) for all l = 1, . . . , p. Let
N ∈ N be given by Lemma 2 and corresponding to K, γ, m and p.
Let Gn = (In, Vn, τn, T,X) be such that Vn(In) is a subset of K. Let σ be a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of Gn. Define a strategy ϕ of Gn by
ϕi(xj|tl) =

∫
Tl
σi(Xj|t)dτi(t)/τi(Tl) if τi(Tl) > 0,
σi(Xj|tl) if τi(Tl) = 0
for all i ∈ In, 1 ≤ l ≤ p and 1 ≤ j ≤ m and ϕi(t) = ϕi(tl) for all t ∈ Tl.
We next claim that the payoff under σ is close to that under ϕ for all players and
types.
Claim 3 For all i ∈ In, t, t′ ∈ T and x, x′ ∈ X such that max{dT (t, t′), dX(x, x′)} <
δ, we have that |Uni (x′, σ−i|t′)− Uni (x, ϕ−i|t)| < 2γ.
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Proof of Claim 3.
We consider two cases: when Gn ∈ GR and when Gn ∈ GK .
Case 1 Gn ∈ GR.
We start this case with the following claim.
Claim 4 For all i ∈ In, ρ(τi ⊗ σi, τi ⊗ ϕi) ≤ δ/2.
Proof of Claim 4. Note that τi ⊗ σi(Tl ×Xj) = τi ⊗ ϕi(Tl ×Xj) for all l and
j. For convenience, let µ = τi ⊗ σi, ν = τi ⊗ ϕi and β = δ/4. Let D ⊆ T × X
be Borel measurable. Let A = {(l, j) : µ((Tl × Xj) ∩ D) > 0} and B = {(l, j) :
ν((Tl ×Xj) ∩ B2β(D)) > 0}. Note that if (l, j) ∈ A, then (Tl ×Xj) ∩D 6= ∅, which
implies that (tl, xj) ∈ Bβ(D). Hence, (t, x) ∈ B2β(D) for all t ∈ Tl and x ∈ Xj, i.e.,
Tl×Xj ⊆ B2β(D). It follows that ν((Tl×Xj)∩B2β(D)) = ν(Tl×Xj) = µ(Tl×Xj) > 0.
Thus, A ⊆ B.
Therefore,
µ(D) =
∑
(l,j)∈A
µ((Tl ×Xj) ∩D) ≤
∑
(l,j)∈A
µ(Tl ×Xj)
=
∑
(l,j)∈A
ν(Tl ×Xj) =
∑
(l,j)∈A
ν((Tl ×Xj) ∩B2β(D))
≤
∑
(l,j)∈B
ν((Tl ×Xj) ∩B2β(D)) = ν(B2β(D)) < ν(B2β(D)) + 2β.
(17)
By Billingsley (1999, p. 72), we also have that ν(D) ≤ µ(B2β(D)) + 2β and so
ρ(µ, ν) ≤ 2β = δ/2.
Since ρ(τi ⊗ σi, τi ⊗ ϕi) ≤ δ/2 for all i ∈ In, it follows that ρ(ϕ¯−i, σ¯−i) ≤ δ/2.
Thus, |Uni (x′, σ−i|t′)− Uni (x, ϕ−i|t)| = |V ni (t′, x′, σ¯−i)− V ni (t, x, ϕ¯−i)| < γ.
Case 2 Gn ∈ GK.
The partitions {X1, . . . , Xm} and {T1, . . . , Tp} induce a partition {C1, . . . , Cmp}
of T × X. Since τi ⊗ ϕi(Tl × Xj) = τi ⊗ σi(Tl × Xj) for all i ∈ In, l = 1, . . . , p and
j = 1, . . . ,m, then, [τ ⊗ ϕ]−i(
∏
j 6=iCrj) = τ ⊗ σ−i(
∏
j 6=iCrj) for all i ∈ In, j 6= i and
rj ∈ {1, . . . ,mp}. Let Ξ−i = {
∏
j 6=iCrj : rj ∈ {1, . . . ,mp} for all j 6= i}.
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Clearly, it is enough to show that∣∣∣∣∫
A
V ni (t, x, empc−i)d[τ ⊗ ϕ]−i(c−i)−
∫
A
V ni (t
′, x′, empc−i)d[τ ⊗ σ]−i(c−i)
∣∣∣∣ < 2γ[τ⊗σ]−i(A)
(18)
for all A ∈ Ξ−i.
Let A ∈ Ξ−i and cˆ−i ∈ A. Hence, if c−i ∈ A, then max{dT (tj, tˆj), dX(xj, xˆj)} <
δ/2 for all j 6= i and so ρ(empc−i , empcˆ−i) ≤ δ/2 by Lemma 1. Since [τ ⊗ ϕ]−i(A) =
[τ ⊗ σ]−i(A), it follows that∣∣∣∣∫
A
V ni (t, x, empc−i)d[τ ⊗ ϕ]−i(c−i)−
∫
A
V ni (t
′, x′, empc−i)d[τ ⊗ σ]−i(c−i)
∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∫
A
V ni (t, x, empc−i)d[τ ⊗ ϕ]−i(c−i)− [τ ⊗ ϕ]−i(A)V ni (t′, x′, empcˆ−i)
∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣[τ ⊗ σ]−i(A)V ni (t′, x′, empcˆ−i)− ∫
A
V ni (t
′, x′, empc−i)d[τ ⊗ σ]−i(c−i)
∣∣∣∣
< 2γ[τ ⊗ σ]−i(A).
(19)
Thus, we obtain the desired conclusion.
We next show that ϕ is a strong 4γ – equilibrium of Gn. Fix i ∈ In and t ∈ T .
Let tl ∈ Tˆ be such that ϕi(t) = ϕi(tl) and xj ∈ Xˆ be such that xj ∈ supp(ϕi(t)).
The definition of ϕi(t) implies that there exists t
′ ∈ Tl and x′ ∈ Xj such that x′ ∈
supp(σi(t
′)). Since σ is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, it follows by Claim 3 that, for
all x ∈ X,
Uni (xj, ϕ−i|t) > Uni (x′, σ−i|t′)− 2γ ≥ Uni (x, σ−i|t′)− 2γ > Uni (x, ϕ−i|t)− 4γ. (20)
Thus, ϕ is a strong 4γ – equilibrium of Gn.
Furthermore, |Uni (ϕ|t) − Uni (σ|t)| < 7γ for all i ∈ In and t ∈ T . This claim can
be established as follows. Let l ∈ {1, . . . , p} be such that t ∈ Tl and j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
be such that xj ∈ supp(ϕi(t)). Then, |Uni (ϕ|t)−Uni (xj, ϕ−i|t)| < 4γ. Also, let t′ ∈ Tl
and x′ ∈ Xj be such that x′ ∈ supp(σi(t′)). Since σ is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium,
then Uni (σ|t) = maxx Uni (x, σ−i|t) and Uni (σ|t′) = maxx Uni (x, σ−i|t′) = Uni (x′, σ−i|t′).
Since dT (t, t
′) < δ, then |Uni (σ|t) − Uni (x′, σ−i|t′)| < γ.3 Therefore, it follows from
Claim 4 and from max{dT (t, t′), dX(xj, x′)} < δ that |Uni (ϕ|t)− Uni (σ|t)| < 7γ.
3This conclusion follows from a standard “maximum theorem” argument (see Berge (1997, p.
116)). In fact, maxx Uni (x, σ−i|t′) = Uni (x′, σ−i|t′) < Uni (xj , σ−i|t) + γ ≤ maxx Uni (x, σ−i|t) + γ
15
Consider the game Gˆn = (In, Vn, τˆn, T,X) with τˆ
n
i (tl) = τ
n
i (Tl) for all l ∈ {1, . . . , p}
and i ∈ In. Let Uˆni denote player i’s payoff function in Gˆn, which is defined as Uni
but with τˆnk in place of τ
n
k for all k ∈ In. Since τi⊗ϕi(Tl×Xj) = τˆi⊗ϕi(Tl×Xj) for
all i ∈ In, l ∈ {1, . . . , p} and j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, then, using an argument similar to that
in Claim 3, it follows that
|Uˆni (x, ϕ−i|t)− Uni (x′, ϕ−i|t′)| < 2γ (21)
for all i ∈ In, t, t′ ∈ T and x, x′ ∈ X such that max{dT (t, t′), dX(x, x′)} < δ. Thus, ϕ is
a strong 8γ – equilibrium of Gˆn. Furthermore, |Uˆni (ϕ|t)−Uni (ϕ|t)| ≤
∫
X
|Uˆni (x, ϕ−i|t)−
Uni (x, ϕ−i|t)|dϕi(x|t) < 2γ for all i ∈ In and t ∈ T .
Since |Tˆ | = p and |Xˆ| = m, it follows by Lemma 2 that there is a γ – purification
g of ϕ satisfying gi(t) = gi(tl) for all t ∈ Tl and all l ∈ {1, . . . , p}. Thus, g is a strong
9γ – equilibrium of Gˆn and |Uˆni (g|t)− Uˆni (ϕ|t)| < 9γ. Furthermore, as above, we have
that
|Uˆni (x, g−i|t)− Uni (x′, g−i|t′)| < 2γ (22)
for all i ∈ In, t, t′ ∈ T and x, x′ ∈ X such that max{dT (t, t′), dX(x, x′)} < δ.
We first claim that g is an ε – equilibrium of Gn. Let i ∈ In, t ∈ T and x ∈ X.
Let l ∈ {1, . . . , p} be such that t ∈ Tl and j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} be such that x ∈ Xj. Then,
gi(t) = gi(tl) and U
n
i (gi(t), g−i|t) > Uˆni (gi(tl), g−i|tl) − 2γ ≥ Uˆni (xj, g−i|tl) − 11γ >
Uni (x, g−i|t)− 13γ and 13γ < ε.
Finally, |Uni (g|t)−Uni (ϕ|t)| ≤ |Uni (g|t)−Uˆni (g|t)|+|Uˆni (g|t)−Uˆni (ϕ|t)|+|Uˆni (ϕ|t)−
Uni (ϕ|t)| < (2 + 9 + 2)γ = 13γ, for all i ∈ In and t ∈ T . Thus, |Uni (g|t)− Uni (σ|t)| <
20γ < ε for all i ∈ In and t ∈ T and so g is an ε – purification of σ.
4 An example: Cournot Oligopoly
In this section we show that Theorem 1 can be applied to the Cournot oligopoly game
described in the Introduction.
and, letting x∗ ∈ supp(σi(t)), maxx Uni (x, σ−i|t′) ≥ Uni (x∗, σ−i|t′) > Uni (x∗, σ−i|t) − γ =
maxx Uni (x, σ−i|t)− γ.
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First, note that it belongs to the class GK . Indeed, letting id denote the identity
function in R and µX denote the marginal of µ on X for all µ ∈ M(T × X), we
simply have to define V ni (t, x, µ) = P (
n−1
n
∫
R iddµX +
x
n
)x − C(t, x). Letting, for all
c−i = (t−i, x−i) ∈ C−i, µc−i denote the marginal empc−i,X of empc−i on X, one easily
obtains that µc−i(A) = |{j 6= i : xj ∈ A}|/(n− 1) for all Borel measurable subsets A
of X and that
∫
R iddµc−i =
∑
j 6=i xj/(n − 1). Thus, for all i ∈ In, t ∈ T , x ∈ X and
σ ∈ Σ,
Ui(x, σ−i|t) =
∫
C−i
V ni (t, x, empc−i)d[τ ⊗ σ]−i =∫
C−i
P
(
x+
∑
j 6=i xj
n
)
d[τ ⊗ σ]−i(t−i, x−i)− C(t, x) =∫
T−i
[∫
X−i
P
(
x+
∑
j 6=i xj
n
)
dσ−i(x−i|t−i)
]
dτ−i(t−i)− C(t, x),
(23)
which, when σ is a pure strategy, corresponds to the expression given in the Intro-
duction. Second, note that K = {(t, x, µ) 7→ P (n−1
n
∫
R iddµX+
x
n
)x−C(t, x) : n ∈ N}
is equicontinuous due to the continuity of the functions P , C and µ 7→ ∫R iddµX and
the compactness of T and X. Thus, it follows from Theorem 1 that all Bayesian Nash
equilibria of the Cournot competition game can be approximately purified whenever
the number of firms is sufficiently large.
5 Related Literature
In this section we discuss the relationship between our framework and result and
those of Rashid (1983), Cartwright and Wooders (2002), Kalai (2004) and Wooders,
Cartwright, and Selten (2006). The main findings are the following: (1) Our result
allows us to generalize those of Rashid (1983) and Wooders, Cartwright, and Selten
(2006). (2) Our framework is more general than that of Kalai (2004), but our result
is formally unrelated to his. (3) Our framework and result is formally unrelated with
that of Cartwright and Wooders (2002).
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5.1 Relationship with Rashid (1983)
Rashid (1983) considers the framework described in Subsection 2.1 with the following
assumptions: T is a singleton and X is finite. Since we allow both T and X to be an
arbitrarily compact metric space, it follows that our framework is more general than
his, thus, our Theorem 1 extends his purification result.
5.2 Relationship with Kalai (2004)
Kalai (2004) considers the framework described in Section 2.2 with the following
assumptions: both T and X are finite. Thus, our framework is more general than
his. However, our result is formally unrelated to his: Even though our result requires
weaker assumptions, it reaches a weaker conclusion. In fact, our purification notion is
weaker than the notion of self-purification used in Kalai (2004) (see Cartwright and
Wooders (2004)).
5.3 Relationship withWooders, Cartwright and Selten (2006)
The relationship between our framework with that of Wooders, Cartwright, and Selten
(2006) is less direct when compared to those discusses above. Nevertheless, in this
subsection we show how to obtain the purification result of Wooders, Cartwright,
and Selten (2006). Their framework is defined by a compact metric type space Ω
(which is referred to as the attribute space), a finite action space S and a function h.
Using our notation, let T = Ω and X = S. Players’ types are defined by an attribute
function α : In → Ω, with the interpretation that αi is player i’s type. Thus, we can
define τi = 1αi . Finally, for all pure strategies f = (f1, . . . , fn), player i’s payoff is
h(αi, fi, wα,f ) where wα,f (t, x) = |{i ∈ In : αi = t and f(i) = x}| for all (t, x) ∈ T×X.
We claim that, when the large game property of Wooders, Cartwright, and Selten
(2006) is satisfied, h can be used to define a continuous real-valued function v on
T ×X ×M(T ×X). This claim can be established as follows: for all finite subsets Tˆ
of T , n ∈ N and functions z : Tˆ → {0, . . . , n} such that∑t∈Tˆ z(t) = n, let M(Tˆ , n, z)
be the set of those ν ∈M(T ×X) satisfying supp(ν) ⊆ Tˆ ×X, nν(t, x) ∈ {0, . . . , n}
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for all (t, x) ∈ Tˆ × X and ∑x∈X nν(t, x) = z(t). Then, we obtain the following
three conclusions. First, note that v(t, x, µ) is easily defined for all t ∈ T , x ∈ X
and µ ∈ M(Tˆ , n, z). In fact, for each µ ∈ M(Tˆ , n, z), we can find an attribute
function α : In → Tˆ and a pure strategy f such that µ = wα,f/n.4 Thus, set
v(t, x, µ) = h(t, x, nµ).
Second, due to the large game property, v is uniformly continuous in T × X ×
M(Tˆ , n, z). This can be established as follows. Note that the expression
1
n
∑
x∈X
∑
t∈α(N)
|wα,f (t, x)− wα,g(t, x)| (24)
(denoted by ρα(f, g) in Wooders, Cartwright, and Selten (2006)) is equal to ||emp(α,f)−
emp(α,g)||1 =
∑
(t,x)∈Tˆ×X |emp(α,f)({(t, x)})− emp(α,g)({(t, x)})|. Moreover, note that
if µ, ν ∈M(Tˆ , n, z) and ρ(µ, ν) < γ, then ||µ− ν||1 < |Tˆ ||X|γ for all γ > 0 such that
Bγ({(t, x)})∩ (Tˆ ×X) = {(t, x)} for all (t, x) ∈ Tˆ ×X. Therefore, for all ε > 0, t, t′ ∈
T , x ∈ X and µ, ν ∈M(Tˆ , n, z) satisfying dT (t, t′) < δ/|Tˆ ||X| and ρ(µ, ν) < δ/|Tˆ ||X|,
where δ > 0 is given by the large game property and corresponding to ε/2 (and is
also chosen to satisfy Bδ/|Tˆ ||X|({(t, x)})∩(Tˆ ×X) = {(t, x)} for all (t, x) ∈ Tˆ ×X), we
obtain that |v(t, x, µ)−v(t′, x, ν)| ≤ |v(t, x, µ)−v(t, x, ν)|+ |v(t, x, ν)−v(t′, x, ν)| < ε.
Hence, v is indeed uniformly continuous in T ×X ×M(Tˆ , n, z).
Third, the collection {M(Tˆ , n, z)}, with Tˆ being a finite subset of T , n ∈ N and
z : Tˆ → {0, . . . , n} satisfying ∑t∈Tˆ z(t) = n, is dense in M(T ×X). In fact, the set
of finitely supported probability measures on T ×X with rational values is dense in
M(T ×X) and any such probability measure belongs to some set M(Tˆ , n, z).
Therefore, it follows from the above facts that v can indeed be extended to a
continuous real-valued function on T × X × M(T × X) (see DePree and Swartz
(1988, Lemma 14, p. 279))). Letting v also denote such extension, we clearly obtain
that K = {v} is equicontinuous.
Finally, we claim that players’ payoffs are defined by (7). Note that if emp(α−i,f−i) =
emp(α−i,g−i) and fi = gi, then wα,f = nemp(α,f) = nemp(α,g) = wα,g and so h(t, x, wα,f ) =
4The set of players is In, the attribute function is chosen to satisfy |{i ∈ In : αi = t}| = z(t) and
f is chosen to satisfy |{i ∈ In : αi = t and fi = x}| = nµ(t, x).
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h(t, x, wα,g) by the global interaction property. This result implies that we can actu-
ally write h(t, x, wα,f ) = v(t, x, emp(α,f)) = v(t, x, emp(α−i,f−i)). Thus, for every pure
strategy f and player i ∈ In in an n-player game, her payoff is
h(αi, fi, wα,f ) = v(αi, fi, empα−i,f−i) =
∫
T−i×X−i
vi(αi, fi, emp(t−i,x−i))d[τ⊗f ]−i(t−i, x−i),
(25)
which is precisely (7) specialized to the case of a pure strategy.
Thus, it follows from Theorem 1 that for all ε > 0, there exists N ∈ N such that
all (Bayesian) Nash equilibria of any game with n ≥ N players induced by (Ω, S, h)
can be ε – purified.
5.4 Relationship with Cartwright and Wooders (2002)
We finally comment on the purification result by Cartwright and Wooders (2002).
Although their result neither is implied by nor implies our main result, the follow-
ing comparison can be made. In fact, their result is weaker to the extent that their
type space is finite and their action space is countable, whereas they can be count-
able or uncountable in ours. However, their result is stronger in the following as-
pects: their action space is not required to be compact and players’ types are not
required to be independent. Furthermore, some comparison can be made regarding
the continuity assumptions used in the two papers. For all µ, ν ∈ M(T × X), let
s(µ, ν) = sup(t,x)∈T×X |µ({(t, x)}) − ν({(t, x)})|. When T × X is finite, endowing it
with the metric s or ρ yields the same notion of continuity. Furthermore, when T ×X
is countable, s is also a metric and the topology on M(T ×X) it induces is stronger
than that induced by ρ.5 Hence, in the case where T ×X is countable, the continuity
assumption used by Cartwright and Wooders (2002) is weaker than ours. Finally,
when T × X is not countable, s is a pseudo-metric but the topology it induces is
neither weaker nor stronger than that induced by ρ.
5It can be easily shown that if s(µk, µ)→ 0, then lim infk µk(A) ≥ µ(A) for all Borel measurable
subsets A of T × X. In particular, the inequality holds when A is open, and this implies that
ρ(µk, µ)→ 0.
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Our approach is, essentially, topological: once we strengthen Rashid’s purification
result for the model with a finite number of actions, we use compactness and continu-
ity to extend it. In contrast, Cartwright and Wooders (2002) address the purification
problem directly by approximating mixed strategies with pure strategies. Their ap-
proach is important since it provides tools to directly address the countable case, and
yields a purification result which is quite strong along many important dimensions.
However, it seems that this strength needs to be compensated somehow, by placing
assumptions on the cardinality of T and X.
Finally, we note that our approach can be combined with theirs to obtain a pu-
rification result for games in the class GR with σ-compact actions spaces, i.e., the
action space is the union of compact sets (an analogous remark has made before in
Cartwright and Wooders (2002)). The reason is as follows: First, we can obtain a
Bayesian game in the framework of Cartwright and Wooders (2002) starting with a
game in GR. The argument is simpler than the one in Subsection 5.3 since we do not
need to extend players’ payoff functions to a larger domain, but rather, have to re-
strict them to a smaller one. Second, we can use their purification theorem to obtain
a purification result for countably supported strategies (obtaining a result analogous
to Lemma 2 in this fashion). Third, and finally, we can use the arguments used
in the proof of Theorem 1 to extend the previous result to general (not necessarily
countably supported) strategies on a σ-compact action space. Indeed, any strategy
can be approximated with a strategy with a finite support within each compact set
belonging to the countable collection whose union is the action space.
References
Ash, R. (1972): Real Analysis and Probability. Academic Press, London.
Berge, C. (1997): Topological Spaces. Dover, New York.
Billingsley, P. (1999): Convergence of Probability Measures. Wiley, New York,
2nd edn.
21
Carmona, G. (2004): “On the Purification of Nash Equilibria of Large Games,”
Economics Letters, 85, 215–219.
Cartwright, E., and M. Wooders (2002): “On Equilibrium in Pure Strategies
in Games with Many Players,” University of Warwick working paper 686 (revised
2005).
(2004): “On Purification of Equilibrium in Bayesian Games and Ex-Post
Nash Equilibrium,” University of Warwick working paper 701.
DePree, J., and C. Swartz (1988): Introduction to Real Analysis. Wiley, New
York.
Kalai, E. (2004): “Large Robust Games,” Econometrica, 72, 1631–1665.
Rashid, S. (1983): “Equilibrium Points of Non-atomic Games: Asymptotic Results,”
Economics Letters, 12, 7–10.
Starr, R. (1969): “Quasi-Equilibria in Markets with Non-Convex Preferences,”
Econometrica, 37, 25–38.
Wooders, M., E. Cartwright, and R. Selten (2006): “Behavioral Conformity
in Games with Many Players,” Games and Economic Behavior, 57, 347–360.
22
